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Abstract:  Like other parts of the globe, south Asia has also been liberalizing the 
trade terms and conditions among its neibouring countries since last decades. 
However, the achievement is still limited although the agreements have been signed 
with was a high hope. This paper examines the opportunities and challenges of the 
preferential trade liberalization and regionalism in South Asia under political 
economy perspective. The study has reviewed secondary data and found that political 
environment is one of the main reasons of not achieving the desired goal of the 
agreements. Lack of trusts and absence of friendly environment among the member 
countries of the region has been working as a barrier for not achieving benefit of the 
agreement. The paper might be useful for policy makers, researchers and academics.  
Keywords: Regionalism; Preferential Trade Agreement; South Asia; Political 
Economy; Economic Development  
 
Résumé:  Comme d'autres parties du monde, l'Asie du Sud est également en train de 
libéraliser des termes et des conditions de commerce dans ses pays voisins depuis ces 
dernières décennies. Toutefois, la réalisation est encore limitée même si les accords 
ont été signés avec un grand espoir. Ce document examine les opportunités et les défis 
de la libéralisation de commerce préférentielle et le régionalisme en Asie du Sud en 
vertu de perspective d'économie politique. L'étude a examiné les données secondaires 
et a constaté que l'environnement politique était l'une des raisons principales de non 
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atteinte du but recherché de ces accords. Le manque de confiance et l'absence d'un 
environnement amicale entre les pays membres de la région ont été considérées 
comme une barrière qui les empêchent d'atteindre des avantages de l'accord. Le 
document pourrait être utile pour les décideurs politiques, les chercheurs et les 
universitaires. 
Mots-clés:  regionalism; accord commercial preferential; Asie du Sud; économie 
politique; développement économique 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper examines the opportunities and challenges of the preferential trade liberalization in South 
Asia under political economy perspective. Successful regionalism and preferential trade liberalisation 
mostly depend on the existence of harmonious political relationships among influential countries of a 
regional organisation. This is partly because of the fact that political factors influence the formulation 
and implementation of various trade policies. Although, advocates of free trade argue that free trade 
maximises benefits of a country through efficient allocation of resources; governments are not always 
guided by efficient-based theorems. Preferential trade liberalisation policies of a country are largely 
determined by on the basis of the strength of pressure groups, rather than on the aggregate welfare 
consideration. The income distribution models of trade theories also account this view (Gawande 2005). 
The ‘Stolper-Samuelson Theorem’ suggests that one factor gains from protection at the expense of 
another. Similarly, the specific-factors model suggests that the specific factors of protected sector gain 
while specific factors in other sectors suffer (Ahmed and Sattar 2004, Carbaugh 2007). This 
discrimination creates conflict of interest among the factor owners, which results in lobby groups. 
Different lobby groups within an economy create strategic interactions between policy makers and lobby 
groups and also among governments of different countries (Gawande 2005).  
Protectionist trade policies abound due to various political constraints. South Asia is not an exception. 
Because of political constraints of free trade, preferential trade liberalisation under regionalism is 
considered to be an important option as a step towards free trade and regional economic integration. It is, 
therefore, necessary to assess preferential trade liberalisation and regionalism in the political economy 
perspective, assuming that protectionist trade policies are to be determined politically. 
Interest in economic analysis of preferential trade liberalisation has increased with the rise of 
regionalism in recent years. Growing dissatisfaction with the progress of multilateral trade negotiations, 
fuelled by the successful regionalism on both side of the Atlantic, has generated further momentum in 
regionalism initiatives. South Asia is not an exception to this process. Driven towards integration by the 
pressure of political and economic security of South Asian region, seven South Asian countries- 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka- formed the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)3 in 1985 (Hossain 1997; Rahman et al, 2006). However, 
since the emergence of SAARC, the achievement has been considered very insignificant and the level of 
intra-regional trade among SAARC countries is still very low. Non-harmonious political relationship 
among the countries of SARRC is one of the important factors that are responsible for insignificant 
progress in regional economic integration. With the present low level of intra-regional trade and the 
perceived competitiveness among the South Asian countries a question has arisen whether regionalism 
would benefit countries of this region. Regarding this question, this study has attempted to analyse the 
implications of regional preferential trade among seven SAARC countries under political economy 
perspective with a view to examining the prospects and challenges of trade liberalisation and regional 
integration in South Asia.  
Many studies have attempted to shed light on the economic integration in South Asian region. Mehta 
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and Kumar (2004) argued that though the intra-regional trade in South Asia was very low, it would be 
still beneficial if SAARC countries would work for deeper integration as in future regionalism would go 
beyond cooperation on formal trade one. Dhungel (2004) noted that despite SAARC member nations 
made several pledges at annual summits to cooperate with each other but actual implementations and 
achievements were considered very insignificant. In a study, Pitigala (2005) found that the trade 
structures that evolved among the South Asian countries might not facilitate a rapid increase in 
intra-regional trade. Jhamb (2006) argued that since its inception in 1985, SAARC did not achieved 
much, primarily due to the tenuous political relations between India and Pakistan and a general 
environment of mistrust among member countries. However, by using a gravity model, Rahman, Shadat, 
and Das (2006) showed that elimination of trade barriers and structural rigidities originating from 
adverse political relationship could lead to substantial increase in intra-SAARC trade. Baysan, 
Panagariya, and Pitigala (2006) argued, compared to the rest of the world  this region is tiny both in 
terms of economic size as measured by GDP ( and per capita income) and the share in the world trade, 
therefore, trade preferences to the regional parterres will likely be leading to a consequence of 
trade-diverting rather than trade-creating. Similarly, Das (2007) argued that evidence of trade 
complementarity in South Asia is mixed, so preferential trading initiative was based on a weak 
proposition. More recently, Newfarmer and Pierola (2007) found that the arrangements of preferential 
trading in South Asia including SAFTA fallen short of their potential because of product exemptions, 
special arrangements for selected products and restrictive rules of origin. Therefore, though upside 
potentials for South Asia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) is great, benefits from this trading 
arrangement are still uncertain and the policy makers will require relentless determinations to make it 
successful. 
In this paper, we will discuss the regionalism in South Asia in section 2, Trade patterns in SAARC 
countries in section 3, political economy and regionalism in section 4, political economy in South Asia in 
section 5, regionalism as strategy for South Asia in section 6 followed by conclusion in section 7. 
 
2.  REGIONALISM AND THE SOUTH ASIA 
 
Regionalism of trade has been on the rise since 1980s. Growing dissatisfaction with multilateral trade 
negotiations (MTNs), as a means of achieving a global free market, has driven the ‘European Economic 
Community’ (EEC) to the development of ‘European Union’ (EU) and the United States to sign the 
‘North American Free Trade Agreement’ (NAFTA) resulting in large trading blocs leading to concerns 
of non cooperative behaviour in future trade negotiations. Though, from the Uruguay Round to Doha 
Development Agenda, multilateral trade negotiations have been successful in some aspects and 
diminished the possibility of non-cooperative behaviour among these large blocs; however, they still 
remain as a threat to the economies of the developing world. The presence of market power in these large 
trading blocs will make them non-cooperative and, therefore, not unlikely that these exercises in 
preferential trade can work as ‘building blocs’ to global free trade (Hallett, and Braga 1994; Kruger 
1995). The potential impact of these large trading blocs, in both side of the Atlantic, on trade and 
investment opportunities of developing countries has led to concerns in the rest of the world, especially 
in Asia, over the prospect of less advantageous access to the international markets. As a result, they also 
began exploring the possibilities of having their own regional integration scheme (Hossain 1997; Mehta, 
and Kumar 2007). It has been estimated that about 97 percent of global trade involves countries that are 
members of at least one preferential trading agreement, and most of these trading agreements have been 
finalised in last two decades (Baharumsha et al 2007).  
Trade liberalisation and regional economic integration can help to increase intra-regional trade by 
exploring the size of the market. This may in turn yield efficiency and bring benefits not only by 
exploration of economies of scale but also by dynamic shifts in production function. By exposure to a 
regional market, previously shattered domestic firms become more competitive and gain the confidence 
to enter into global competition (Hossain 1997; Newfarmer, and Pierola 2007). 
The economic benefits of regionalism in South Asia have been subject of great debate regarding the 
cooperation among the countries and the large asymmetry in economies of the region. By land area and 
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the size of population and economy, South Asia is an ‘Indo-centric’ region as India has been occupying 
76 percent of the total land area of the region and accommodating 77 percent of the region’s population 
and capturing almost 80 percent GDP of the region. It has borders with all other six countries none of 
which is geographically closer to the others. Despite their strong shared history, these countries are 
diverse in their religion and political culture. Bilateral political relations are not harmonious. Trade 
relations among them have so far been shaped largely by non-economic factors. Despite India and 
Pakistan formed a common market, since the independence of these countries in1947, mistrust and 
disputes during the following decades have been the main reasons for the low level of intra-regional 
trade (Hossain1997; Coulibaly 2007). Although, the South Asian countries have now realised that 
development of cooperation among SAARC countries can benefit them all but starting from such an 
initial condition and existing non-harmonious bilateral relationships between the countries in the region 
have raised the question as to the extent of benefit from such cooperation. 
 
3.  REGIONAL TRADE PATTERNS AND BILATERAL TRADE 
OF SAARC COUNTRIES 
 
The south Asian countries are basically not natural trading partners. Driven by their desire for export-led 
development, the south Asian countries began expanding their export towards industrial countries, 
moving from basic agricultural exports to labour-intensive manufactured exports.  
Table 1:  Ranking five major trading partners of South Asian countries, 2005 
PARTNER→ 
REPORTER↓     Rank-1 Rank-2 Rank-3 Rank-4 Rank-5 
Bangladesh 
Exports European Union (56.1) 
United States 
(26.2) 
Canada 
(4.0) Japan (1.5) India (1.3) 
Imports China (13.9) India (12.0) European Union (9.9) Japan (9.6) 
Singapore 
(4.3) 
Bhutan 
Exports India (94.4) Bangladesh (4.2)
United 
States (0.5) Nepal (0.5) 
European 
Union (0.1)
Imports India (74.4) Singapore (12.7) Japan (3.3) 
Thai land 
(3.1) 
European 
Union (1.3) 
India 
Exports European Union (22.5) 
United States 
(16.9) UAE(8.3) China (6.6) 
Singapore 
(5.3) 
Imports European Union (17.2) China (7.3) 
United 
States (6.3) 
Switzerland 
(4.4) 
Australia 
(3.3) 
Maldives 
Exports UAE (24.2) European Union (18.1) 
Thailand 
(15.3) Japan (14.6) 
Sri Lanka 
(12.5) 
Imports Singapore (24.1) UAE (15.5) 
European 
Union India (11.3) 
Malaysia 
(7.2) 
Nepal 
Exports India (52.4) United States (29.1)
European 
Union (9.6) China (3.4) 
Bangladesh 
(0.9) 
Imports India (53.0) China (8.4) Singapore (6.3) 
European 
Union(6.3) 
Malaysia 
(3.3) 
Pakistan 
Exports European Union (26.5) 
United States 
(24.8) UAE (7.8) 
Afghanistan  
(6.6)
Hong Kong 
(3.7) 
Imports European Union (17.4) 
Saudi Arabia 
(10.6) UAE (9.9) China (9.4) Japan (6.5) 
Sri Lanka 
Exports United States (32.2) 
European 
Union (31.0) India (9.1) 
Russian 
Fedaratio2.6) UAE (2.4) 
Imports India (17.3) European Union (15.5) 
Singapore 
(8.9) 
Hong Kong 
(7.8) China (7.6) 
Note: Figures in parentheses indicate percentage share of exports and imports 
Source: Data compiled from WTO database files, April 2007 
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By main destinations of exports and origins of imports, South Asian countries perform their trade 
mainly with non-Asian countries. As shown in Table 1, most of the region's trade is performed with the 
European Union and United States. 
The region's exports are mainly destined to developed countries, whereas, both developing and 
developed countries are equally important origins for imports of this region. 
Bilateral trade shares are used to analyse the intra-regional trade patterns of South Asian economies. 
The bilateral trade share is the ratio of one country's trade with its partner to its total trade with the world. 
This share can range from 0 to 100.  Higher bilateral trade share reflects higher level of interdependence 
between a pair of countries.  
Table 2:  Bilateral trade shares of four major SAARC countries: 2000-04 and 2005 (in percent)  
EXPORTS 
PARTNERS → 
REPORTERS ↓ 
Bangladesh India Pakistan Sri Lanka Saarc 
2000-04 
(average) 2005 
2000-04 
(average) 2005
2000-04 
(average) 2005
2000-04 
(average) 2005 
2000-04 
(average) 2005
BANGLADESH na na 1.15 1.35 0.60 0.75 0.09 0.08 1.90 2.20 
INDIA 2.30 1.60 na na 0.45 0.65 1.75 1.95 5.45 5.25 
PAKISTAN 1.75 1.45 1.10 2.10 na na 1.02 0.95 3.90 4.55 
SRI LANKA 0.22 0.24 5.35 9.05 0.70 0.70 na na 7.35 10.35
SAARC 1.80 1.40 0.90 0.80 0.45 0.60 1.45 1.65 4.70 4.50 
IMPORTS 
BANGLADESH na na 14.55 12.02 1.45 1.70 0.10 0.10 16.20 13.85
INDIA 0.09 0.08 na na 0.10 0.12 0.35 0.40 0.90 0.95 
PAKISTAN 0.35 0.25 3.05 2.30 na na 0.35 0.25 3.80 2.85 
SRI LANKA 0.09 0.09 18.85 17.30 1.25 1.40 na na 20.55 19.05
SAARC 0.10 0.10 3.35 2.35 0.30 0.25 0.40 0.35 4.20 3.10 
Note: 1) na means not applicable. 
Source: Data calculated from UNcomtrade database, United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics, August 2007 
 
From Table 2 it is clear that the South Asian countries engage in small trade within the region. In 2005, 
amongst the four major economies of the region, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka import relatively more from 
the region than do the others.  Sri Lanka has got the highest bilateral shares of trade with SAARC. These 
figures for exports and imports are 10.35 and 19.05 percent respectively. The region’s both export and 
import shares destined to and  originated from  this region have been in declining trend over the last few 
years.  That is partly because of a low and insignificant level of involvement in bilateral trade by region’s 
large countries such as India and Pakistan. 
For the of whole SAARC economy, the share of intra-regional trade to its global trade has declined 
over the period in 2000-04 and 2005. The share of intra-regional imports to global imports of SAARC 
economy has declined from 4.20 percent in 2000-04 average to 3.50 percent in 2005, while its share of 
intra-regional exports to global exports has declined marginally over the same period and remained 
around 4.50 percent. 
 
4.  POLITICAL ECONOMY AND REGIONALISM 
 
There has been an emerging reality for the increasing range and degree of cooperation of states in terms 
of economic integration, both regionally and globally. Though most economists and policy analysts 
argue in favour of unilateral trade liberalisation, policy makers find it difficult to transform this view to 
reality due to political constraints. Conflicts among the special-interest groups within a country or a 
region play an important role in shaping trade policy. Capital owners and labour in important competing 
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industries are usually effective in lobbying to retain or increase protection, as their gains from protection 
are reasonably transparent. On the other hand, export-oriented producers and consumers favour less 
protection (McCulloch et al 2003, Maggi and Clare 2005). 
Regionalism in trade is essentially a politico-economic phenomenon. It attracts support for both 
political and economic reasons and from both protectionists and free traders. Some economist like 
Baldwin (1993) attribute the success of European Union (EU) mainly to the fact that it strengthened both 
the democratic political institutions and free market-oriented institutions of the constituent countries by 
increasing their degree of independence. In fact, in the evolution to the present form of EU, political 
considerations have largely dominated over economic considerations. On the other hand, one of the 
major reasons for the failure of trading blocs among developing countries has been the lack of political 
commitment. Attempts to implements reform programs without political commitment of the countries’ 
leaders are seen to have been ended in failure (Gawande 2005). 
Domestic policy preferences are not independent of international relations. Therefore, policy makers 
have to play a two-level game- one with special-interest groups in the domestic political arena and the 
other with the governments of foreign countries in international arena. Grossman and Helpman (1995) 
argue that a free trade area might be acceptable to a government if it generates substantial welfare gains 
to the voters. 
 
5.  THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SOUTH ASIA 
 
The land and topography make South Asia a single geographical unit. All economies in this region are 
based on agriculture with low per capita income and relatively high population density. All countries in 
South Asia, except Nepal, were under foreign domination. They have been under British colonial rule for 
about two hundreds years prior to late 1940s sharing common internal administration and judicial system 
as well as common external relation. However, British colonial rule brought together a constellation of 
forces that resulted in an ever-growing discord and polarisation between Hindus and Muslims, the two 
major religious groups leading eventually to the emergence of the present nation-states in this region. 
The previously integrated political and economic framework of South Asia was inevitably split into 
several economies with independent commercial policies and external linkages. 
This disintegration of once integrated system was mainly attributed to political factors rather than 
economic reasons and, therefore, the collision of nationalities within the region led to the disruption that 
paved the way for growth of the national interest-groups in each newly emergent country (Sobhan 1989; 
Naqvi, Schuler, and Ritcher 2007). As a result, the economies of this region raised protectionist barriers 
against each other making the region marginal to the external economic relation of each country. The 
economic policies of these countries are, therefore, not based on national evaluation of social welfare 
rather the outcome of the conflicting influences of pressure groups. 
Until the end of 1985, South Asia was the only region without a regional forum of its own. The 
territorial and political separation, ethnic rivalries and military confrontation since the end of colonial 
rule had turned the region into a crisis-ridden arena in international politics. Though South Asia is 
recognised as a region of geographical unity and cultural commonalities, the history of inter-state 
relation is marked more by conflict than cooperation (Hossain 1997; Mehta, and Kumar 2007). 
The pangs of birth of nation-states overshadowed the heritage shared by South Asian countries. The 
geo-political reality of the centrality of India’s geographical and economic position in the region and the 
history of the region has contributed to the long-prevailing environment of mistrust (Hossain 1997; 
Dhungel 2004, Jamb 2006). This is particularly true in the Indo-Pak relationship, the greatest barrier to 
South Asian regional cooperation (Ghose, 1989). India and Pakistan, the two major countries, owe their 
birth to nationalism based on religion. The religious differences between these two nations have been 
given a communal appearance by formation of political parties. The conflict between these main South 
Asian nations resulted into two bloody wars in 1965 and 1971- the former over the Kashmir’s territorial 
issues and the latter involving with the independence of Bangladesh. Furthermore, the two countries are 
locked in an escalating arms race and have acquired nuclear weapons, despite the economic hardships 
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facing their people. 
India’s relationships with its other neighbours, such as Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, are beset by gaps in 
trust. Nonetheless, bilateral relations between Bangladesh and Sri Lanka and between Pakistan and Sri 
Lanka are friendly and cooperative. India’s relationship with Sri Lanka has been strained by ethnic feud 
and India’s involvement in the crisis on the grounds of ethnic affinity to the Sri Lankan Tamil. India’s 
relationship with Bangladesh has been its ups and downs since 1971 when India proved to be the closest 
friend of Bangladesh. With the passage of time, bilateral relations between these two friendly nations 
had become dominated by internal factors such as sharing of natural resources e.g. water resources of 
common rivers, and border disputes including demarcation of maritime boundaries, are the main source 
of mistrust between these two neighbours. The relationships  was aggravated by the suspected Indian 
involvement in the tribal insurgency in the South-eastern hill districts of Bangladesh and Bangladesh’s 
alleged support for the insurgency in some Eastern states of India such as Tripura and Mezoram. 
Bangladesh’s relationship with Pakistan is also dominated by the traumatic experience of its bloody 
war of independence in 1971. The relationship has yet to find strong footing because of two controversial 
issues- (1) the division of assets, and (2) the repatriation of the stranded Pakistanis living in Bangladesh. 
The relationship between Nepal and India is also not harmonious. Like Bhutan, Nepal is also a country 
land locked by India. Nepal, therefore, must use India’s land to access to sea ports for international trade. 
Regarding the issue of using India’s land by Nepal is the main point of dispute between these two 
neighbours and it had turned into the worst position in 1989 when India imposed restrictions on using 
transit to Nepal. However, the relationships between Nepal and other SAARC countries are harmonious. 
Bhutan and Maldives, the other members of SAARC, are very small in terms of political influence and 
economic domination in the region representing only 0.083 percent and 0.080 percent of region’s 
economy respectively. Therefore, they have a very insignificant influence over the trade and economic 
policy of the region as a whole. As per Athukorala and Riede’s (1991) ‘Small Country Assumption’, 
these two countries seem to be price takers in the regional trade. Moreover, Bhutan is a much closed 
economy and due to geographical condition (land-locked by India) and inadequate infrastructure 
facilities all of its international trade is almost with India covering more than 90 percent of its total trade 
(Table 1). These two countries have harmonious relationships with other SAARC countries. 
After independence from British colonial rule, all countries of South Asia adopted economic policies 
which led to mixed public-private economies in the region. All of them adopted plan approach to 
economic development but the economic development of the region has not been substantial over the last 
half century since independence from the British rule. Internal insatiability and security-phobia reduced 
the prospect of economic security. As a result the region’s economies grew to depend on the outside 
world for economic survival rather than on them (Hossain 1997; Mehta, and Kumar 2007). 
 
6.  REGIONALISM AS A STRATEGY FOR ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH ASIA 
 
The belated start and slow growth of regional cooperation in South Asia is a direct consequence of the 
lack of political commitment that has been originated from bilateral political disputes. If the political 
disputes are settled, the countries of the region can gain enormously from intra-regional economic 
activities. For example, by allowing transit facilities among three countries- Bangladesh, India and 
Pakistan can generate substantial economic gains for themselves. 
The presence of economic asymmetry in the region has also made political economy of this region 
unfavourable for regional integration. In fact, apprehension of Indian economic domination is a great 
obstacle to regional trading agreement. With this economic asymmetry, distribution of gains from a 
‘discriminatory trading area’ (DTA) would be uneven. The smaller countries, who will lose due to 
regionalism, need to be compensated by way of assistance in restructuring their economies, so that the 
larger market are considered by others as a window of opportunity. 
The size of population and land area of India may offer the potential to generate enhanced economic 
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growth in the region. Due to high tariff, Indian states trade internally with other states even under 
situations of high transportation costs, although international trade with neighbouring countries would 
be less costly option in the absence of tariffs. Therefore, SAFTA would create substantial intra-regional 
trade by replacing Indian internal trade, given the substantial transportation costs associated with 
internal trade within this large country. Moreover, SAFTA may also create trade in goods and services 
that are usually non-traded (for example, electricity) (Hossain, 1997; Das 2007). 
Potential long term benefits of a regional arrangement also exists in exploration of natural resources, 
human capital formation, and exploration of static as well as dynamic gains from trade. Economic 
cooperation in South Asia, with a domestic-regional market of more than 1.4 billion population, should 
make a significant contribution to South Asian development by way of increasing the productive 
capacities of the member countries to take advantage of economies of scale and so to become 
internationally more competitive. In addition, the higher the regional arrangement takes institutional 
shape, the more it will strengthen its barraging power with the outside world. 
With preferential trade, the members would eliminate trade barriers within the region and perhaps go 
for harmonising economic policies. This would create greater welfare gains than if the pre-agreement 
economic policies were constructed on the basis of welfare judgment. The countries will also be in better 
situation to move towards liberal economic policies by withstanding the pressure of special interest 
groups through the plea of regional commitments. 
Improved political understanding will result in erasing mistrust and convergence of the security 
perceptions of the countries. This should lead to the countries reducing their military expenditures that 
could be employed to improve productive capacity. With the deepening of regionalism the current level 
of hostilities should be reduced. This will further increase intra-regional trade. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
South Asia, with nearly one fourth of world’s population, is one of the poorest regions in the world. Past 
inward-looking policies pursued by countries of the region failed to realise its potential for economic 
development. In recent years, the SAARC countries have initiated a process of unilateral trade 
liberalisation leading to outward-orientation. Simultaneously, although they have also started a process 
of regionalism; neither the political understanding nor economic climate within the region has been 
conducive to promoting intra-regional trade. 
Findings of this study suggest that the non-harmonious bilateral political relationships of SAARC 
countries may be a big obstacle on the way to implementing preferential trading agreement. As with the 
SAFTA, even if the scheme were widen, it is unlikely to improve intra-regional trade unless other related 
schemes of regional cooperation are also introduced, aiming at creating greater complementarities 
among the economies of the region such as improving their supply capabilities (i.e. investment and 
production partnerships, such as regional/bilateral joint ventures), and creating efficient infrastructure 
linkages, especially in terms of transport and communications and information exchange. This will not 
only enable the efficient utilisation of the capabilities and resources of SAARC countries but also will 
contribute significantly to the concept of self reliance in South Asian region. It is argued that in order to 
accelerate the pace of regional trade liberalisation, it might be preferable to adopt two tracks- one being 
the region wide slower track, and the other, a series of bilateral agreements between the more advanced 
countries within the group. There are already some bilateral initiatives between India and Sri Lanka, 
India and Bangladesh, and India and Nepal. Sectoral cooperation, such as SAARC Textile Council, 
could also boost economic and trade relation of the region. The major sectors, such as textile- an 
important component of SAARC courtiers’ exports, will need to rise to the challenge for open 
competition. The SAARC producers will more likely be to achieve this if they pool their design, 
marketing and technological resources.  
It is argued that preferential trade liberalisation measures would not contribute significantly to 
intra-regional trade in South Asia at its present stage of development, owing to the constraints already 
noted. Although, all member countries unanimously agreed to removal of all trade barriers; the progress 
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is still very slow and the existing cold bilateral relationships between countries, particularly between two 
big economic powers of the region- India and Pakistan, make the future of regional integration in South 
Asia more unclear and uncertain. However, it is not an impossible task for the SAARC countries to 
transform South Asia from a poorest region in the world to the richest one by utilising available 
resources efficiently and exploring the potential of sustainable development of the region. This may 
depend on the removal of the existing bilateral political disputes for the grater interest of South Asia and, 
therefore, all countries, particularly two large countries- India and Pakistan, should work together with 
strong goodwill aiming at a prosperous and developed South Asia. 
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